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Pockets of Privilege: A Historical, Spatial, and 
Political Economy Analysis of Industrial Zones in 
Palestine 
 
ROHAN ADVANI* 
 
Abstract This article argues that industrial zones in Palestine do not effectively promote 
Palestinian economic development. The article rests on a historical, spatial, and 
economic analysis of the political economy of industrial zones in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. By examining the nature and functionality of these zones through different 
methodological lenses, it is clear that the industrial zones in Palestine fail on two levels. 
Firstly, as successful export-processing zones and employment generating programs, the 
zones are unable to deliver their intended results. On the other hand, even when they do 
succeed, their performance is limited and does not contribute to a holistic, democratic, 
and egalitarian notion of economic development. In fact, the benefits accrued are often 
channeled to Palestinian elites and foreign capital, at the expense of popular Palestinian 
economic needs such as viable employment, healthcare, housing, food security, and 
domestic investment. Moreover, the zones work well within the confines of the Israeli 
Occupation and seem to entrench aspects of its overarching architecture. Lastly, this 
article argues that industrial zones in Palestine are elements in a wider political and 
economic project that is being increasingly defined by political, economic, and spatial 
fragmentation. The emerging social topography is in fact a spatial effect produced by the 
convergence of Palestinian capitalist class power, international financial institutions 
(IFIs), the Israeli Occupation, and the expansion of foreign capital. The effect is a future 
Palestinian state that is highly undemocratic, corrupt, and rife with inequality. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Industrial zones, industrial estates, and free trade zones have been at the forefront of 
global neoliberal economic development since the 1970s. Though conflict and occupation 
are hardly conducive environments to economic development, these zones have crept 
through the development world and have unexpectedly found a place in Palestine. The 
establishment of these zones in Palestine has been part of a wider shift in developmental 
strategy. Since the Oslo Accords of 1993, economic planning has moved away from 
resistance efforts in pursuit of national liberation to neoliberal orthodoxy – privatization, 
produce for export, strengthening the security apparatus, public-private partnerships, 
fiscal austerity, and further integration of the Palestinian economy into the global 
economy. The establishment of industrial zones throughout Palestine has been one of the 
most important economic ventures promoted by the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the past 
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decades “as a driving force to attract investments in order to revive and develop the 
Palestinian economy.”1 Therefore, this article seeks to narrate the history of industrial 
zones in Palestine and critically analyze their ability to effectively promote national 
economic development. 
In general, industrial estates and free trade zones are special zones that are 
planned for the sole purpose of industrial development and manufacturing. However, as 
opposed to regular industrial output, these zones often offer special economic incentives 
such as tax exemptions, free movement of capital and profits, preferential access to 
international markets, and infrastructure investments.  Sometimes referred to in the 
literature as export processing zones (EPZs), they constitute what Ronen Palan terms the 
‘offshore economy.’ Palan writes that the notion of ‘offshore’ “refers not to the 
geographic location of economic activities, but to the juridical status of a vast and 
expanding array of specialized realms.”2  
The notion of ‘offshore’ has become an increasingly important phenomenon 
within the Palestinian political economy. The recent Panama Papers reveal that President 
Mahmoud Abbas’ son, Tareq Abbas, holds close to $1M of shares in the Arab Palestinian 
Investment Company (APIC). Registered in the British Virgin Islands with the help of 
Gulf-based capital, APIC invests heavily throughout the Palestinian economy and owns 
companies that act as agents for Western corporations such as Phillip Morris, Proctor and 
Gamble, GlaxoSmithKline, and others.3 In turn, this article will also unpack an emerging 
Palestinian political economy that is being dominated by Palestinian elites, foreign 
capital, international financial institutions (IFIs) and donor agencies via offshore 
strategies. Notwithstanding, this article will firmly situate the emergence of these forces 
within the context of the Israeli Occupation and will also demonstrate that the Occupation 
is undoubtedly the biggest obstacle to development in the territories. 
First, by unpacking the history of the development of industrial zones in Palestine 
within the regional and global context, and then by embarking on a spatial analysis of 
these zones, this article will demonstrate that industrial zones in Palestine do not seem to 
effectively promote Palestinian economic development. As successful export-processing 
zones and employment generating programs, the zones are unable to deliver their 
intended results. Even when they do succeed, their performance is limited and do not 
contribute to a holistic, democratic, and egalitarian notion of economic development. In 
fact, the benefits accrued are often channeled to Palestinian elites and foreign capital, at 
the expense of popular Palestinian economic needs such as viable employment, 
healthcare, housing, food security, and domestic investment. Moreover, the zones work 
well within the confines of the Israeli Occupation and seem to entrench aspects of its 
overarching architecture. Lastly, this article argues that industrial zones in Palestine are 
elements in a wider political and economic project that is being increasingly defined by 
political, economic, and spatial fragmentation. The emerging social topography is in fact 
                                                        
1 “CEO of PIEFZA,” Palestine Industrial Estates & Free Zone Authority, 
http://www.piefza.ps/en/content/ceo-piefza-0. 
2 Ronen Palan, The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad Millionaires 
(Berkeley: Cornell University Press, 2006), 2. 
3 Uri Blau and Daniel Dolev, “Panama Papers: Leaks Reveal Abbas’ Son’s $1M Holding in Company With 
Ties to Palestinian Authority,” Haaretz, April 7, 2016, http://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-
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a spatial effect produced by the convergence of Palestinian capitalist class power, 
international financial institutions (IFIs), the Israeli Occupation, and the expansion of 
foreign capital. The result will likely be a future Palestinian state that is highly 
undemocratic, corrupt, and rife with inequality.  
 
 
Global History of EPZs 
 
Whilst the majority of EPZs are located in China, they nonetheless prove to be a 
fundamental manifestation of neoliberal economic policy. Though the first industrial park 
established in a developing economy was in Puerto Rico the 1940s, these zones 
proliferated globally in the 1970s in response to the crisis of profitability that the core 
capitalist countries experienced in the previous decade.4 At this time, they were also 
endorsed by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) as a 
legitimate developmental strategy for many developing countries. Third World countries 
were also attracted to the establishment of EPZs largely because of their chronic balance 
of payment deficits and the fact that they could not pass up the opportunity to compete 
with more developed countries in terms of exports. These zones often offered lower 
tariffs, tax exemptions, and provided necessary infrastructure for manufacturing. 
Moreover, as the global economy of the 1970s experienced a process whereby capital 
was becoming increasingly internationalized, these zones facilitated this process by 
offering outlets to absorb such capital. In doing so, the notion of ‘offshore’ became 
increasingly integrated with the global economy, which in turn reinforced the process of 
the internationalization of capital.5 Whilst many Third World countries seized on the 
opportunity to develop EPZs in order to reduce their deficits and debts in light of fierce 
financial competition, these zones were not without their own problems.6 In 1980, a 
UNIDO report noted that EPZs should be used as short-term catalysts and were not long-
term, sustainable developmental strategies. Because the zones often took resources that 
could have been used to develop local infrastructure and businesses, they often proved to 
be somewhat detached from the ‘real’ economy. As the report notes, “The disadvantages 
of the EPZ would appear to lie in the continuation of its enclavistic nature. … 
Perpetuation of the enclave will retain the problems, the social and economic costs, 
without the obvious off-set of further benefits.” 7  However, it is important that we 
conceptualize the proliferation of such zones not as exceptions or external to the state, but 
rather as directly related to the changing class nature of the state. As Palan bluntly writes, 
“offshore is first and foremost a political program, serving the interests of the rich and the 
powerful.”8 Although these zones may have different laws from ‘regular’ territory within 
a given state, they continue to be integral to its political-economic architecture. Sandrine 
                                                        
4 Palan, The Offshore World, 73. 
5 Ibid, 124. 
6 Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South (London: Verso Books, 
2013), 62. 
7 “Export Processing Zones in Developing Countries,” in UNIDO Working Papers on Structural Changes, 
(UNIDO, 1980), 40-41. 
8 Palan, The Offshore World. 63. 
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Tesner emphasizes this point through his notion of meta-space, whereby zones operate 
above borders, rather than delegitimizing state sovereignty.9  
In effect, the development of such zones was always in active response to both 
political and economic problems. While they may have attracted foreign capital to 
restructure balance of payments deficits, they often failed to created strong linkages with 
the rest of the local economy and promote effective national development. Let us now 
turn to a more concrete historical analysis of the development of industrial zones 
specifically in Palestine, while simultaneously keeping in mind these global 
developments.  
 
Development of Industrial Zones Pre-Oslo 
 
In the early years of its Occupation of Palestine (from 1967 until the late 1970s), Israel 
sought to develop some forms of social infrastructure and limited prosperity in the 
territories in order to prevent social unrest and help normalize the Occupation.10 Owing to 
large remittances from the Gulf and Israel, a shift away from domestic agricultural and 
industrial production towards Israeli integration, and restrictions on developing 
institutional infrastructure, the Palestinian Territories under Israeli Occupation actually 
experienced impressive growth, relatively speaking. However, as Neve Gordon notes, 
“the actual resource base of the economy was steadily eroding, as local investment and 
development remained stagnant.”11 These effects were only felt much later. Moreover, 
unlike the 1960s and 1970s, the Israeli development budget in 1980 for the territories was 
zero.12 The prohibition on financial institutions, development banks, and restrictions on 
sources of credit, along with the actions of the Palestinian capitalist class, severely 
hindered capital accumulation and local industrial development. This created a situation 
where there was a large reserve army of labour, and a Palestinian economy that was 
almost completely integrated with Israeli industry and dependent on Israeli demand. As 
Sara Roy notes, Israel transformed the industrial base in the territories into a de facto free 
zone for the benefit of Israeli producers.13  
It was in this context that industrial zones were first envisioned in the Occupied 
Territories by the Israeli government in the late 1980s.14 In 1989, the Sadan development 
plan, established by Israel’s Minister of Finance Ezra Sadan and commissioned by Israeli 
Minister of Defense Moshe Arens, proposed establishing an industrial base in the 
Occupied Territories. The plan “granted Israeli businesses the higher-added tiers of the 
industries into which Palestinian enterprises would be integrated.”15 Moreover, in 1991, 
Military Order 105 “permitted for the first time free Palestinian investment in Gaza”, 
which marked the beginning of Israeli and Palestinian diaspora capital for a joint 
                                                        
9 Sandrine Tesner, and Georg Kell, The United Nations and Business: A Partnership Recovered (London: 
Macmillan, 2000), 26. 
10 Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 62. 
11 Ibid, 75. 
12 Ibid, 73. 
13 Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1995), 239.  
14 Anne Le More. International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money 
(Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2008), 125. 
15 Tariq Dana, “The Symbiosis Between Palestinian ‘Fayyadism’ and Israeli ‘Economic Peace,” Conflict, 
Security & Development 15, no. 5 (2015): 469. 
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industrial venture.16 In light of the First Intifada in 1987 and the imposition of closure, 
these zones were designed with both security and economic concerns in mind. They 
functioned, in essence, as hyper-territorialized and hyper-securitized enclaves that 
embodied all the trends in the Palestinian economy – labour-intensive sub-contracting, 
export-oriented production for Israeli, Gulf, and European markets, and absorption of 
surplus-Israeli capital. With regards to security, they helped solve the ‘demographic’ 
issue of Palestinians crossing the Green Line into Israel by outsourcing manufacturing 
and sub-contracting to the Occupied Territories as opposed to being within Israel. 
Moreover, they proved to be beneficial towards Israeli capitalist interests as the cost of 
Palestinian labour in Palestine was much cheaper than in Israel. In fact, many of these 
industrial zones relied upon exploitative Jordanian labour laws from the 1960s, as 
opposed to Israeli ones that were more labour-friendly. Furthermore, the Israeli 
government believed that these industrial parks would absorb surplus Palestinian labour, 
thereby assuaging social conflict and promoting limited development at the expense of 
freedom from occupation and full national liberation.  
The history of industrial zones in the Occupied Territories points to the fact that 
these zones were developed in response to a deteriorating Palestinian economy and to the 
benefit of Israeli capital. By outsourcing production to the territories, Israeli capital could 
exploit cheaper Palestinian labour whilst also joining forces with Palestinian diaspora 
capital. In turn, this dynamic suggests that only wealthy Palestinians and Israelis were 
able to invest in the development of industrial zones, and therefore solidified their 
position as legitimate nation builders.  
 
Industrial Zones in the Context of the Oslo Accords 
 
The concept of industrial zones resurfaced during the Oslo years (early 1990s), albeit in a 
different form. One of the most popular ideas promoted by the Israeli Left and the Labour 
Party was the notion of economic regional cooperation. Under this framework, joint 
industrial parks were highlighted as a way to encourage development in a weak 
Palestinian economy and build mutual trust between the PA and the Israeli government. 
Initially, the estates were to be developed by both governments, mainly on the border in 
order to fuse Israeli capital with Palestinian labour.17 They were planned in locations such 
as Nablus, Tulkarem, Jericho, Hebron, Karni, and the Rafah/Keren Shalom border.18 
Israeli investors hoped that the products would be exported under the label ‘Made in 
Palestine’, which would allow Israel to penetrate Arab markets and avoid international 
boycott campaigns.19 By 2000, on the eve of the Second Intifada, six industrial parks 
were under construction with investments amounting to approximately $250 million.20 
However, early in the course of negotiations, the prospect of building these joint 
industrial parks faded rapidly. Israel instead proposed the establishment of Israeli-
controlled zones like the Erez Industrial Estate in Gaza. In response to this, the PA and 
                                                        
16 Peter Lagerquist, “Privatizing the Occupation: The Political Economy of an Oslo Development Project,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies, 32, no. 2 (2003): 7. 
17 Markus Bouillon, The Peace Business: Money and Power in the Palestine-Israel Conflict. (New York: 
IB Tauris, 2004), 88. 
18 Ibid, 88. 
19 Ali Abunimah, The Battle for Justice in Palestine. (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014), 14. 
20 Bouillon, The Peace Business, 88. 
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other Palestinian elites decided to unilaterally develop their own zones, handing over the 
process to the Palestine Investment and Development Company (PADICO), resulting in 
the Gaza Industrial Estate (GIE) in 1998.21 However, security guarantees for the free 
movement of goods and peoples were never obtained, and the political environment was 
seemingly too unstable to attract many investors. To make matters worse, during the 
Second Intifada (2000-2005), the construction of many of these industrial estates came to 
an abrupt end, with 75 factories destroyed in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and four 
Israeli factories torched (employing 300 Palestinians) next to the Khaddourie Park in 
Tulkarem.22 According to a 2010 Paltrade report, out of the six planned industrial zones – 
the Gaza Industrial Estate, Jenin Industrial Estate, Khadoury Information Technology 
Estate in Tulkarem, the Agro Industrial Park in Jericho, Bethlehem Industrial Estate, and 
an industrial zone in Tarqumiyah – only the Gaza Industrial Estate had been operating 
successfully.23 To date, only the Jericho-Agro Industrial Park, the Bethlehem Industrial 
Estate, and the GIE are still in operation.24 
Therefore, whilst there was initial cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis in 
developing industrial zones in the Palestinian territories, the history indicates that this 
cooperation was largely meaningless. This manner of cooperation was a microcosm for 
the wider peace process at hand. The Oslo Accords were a step towards peace, yet it 
nonetheless reduced the two sides to equal players without recognizing the vast 
asymmetry in power. In light of this asymmetry and the lack of bargaining power on the 
part of the Palestinians, it became increasingly difficult to obtain security guarantees 
from the Israelis in the context of a military occupation. Consequently, the development 
of industrial zones seemed flawed from the outset. Although the zones were initially 
designed to facilitate the integration of Israeli capital with Western and Gulf markets, 
Israel often relocated its manufacturing to Jordan and Egypt largely because of political 
stability and cheaper labour costs. As I explain in the following section, by relying on the 
cooperation of an occupying power in the face of drastic changes in the global economy 
(i.e. offshore production), industrial zones failed to materialize and effectively promote 
Palestinian economic development.  
 
Oslo and Beyond - the New Middle East 
 
The historical development of industrial estates in Palestine can be traced back to Israeli 
concerns regarding their own economy and management of the Occupied Territories, 
coupled with changes in the global political economy. However, international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and Palestinian political elites also played a critical role in their 
development. Alongside the discussions in Oslo in 1993, a Palestinian industrial estates 
program was established in a somewhat enthusiastic atmosphere by a trilateral economic 
committee headed by Palestinian chief negotiator Abu ‘Ala, US Middle East envoy 
Dennis Ross, and Israeli Foreign Ministry director Uri Savir. 25  Throughout these 
discussions, tentative agreements on the construction of industrial estates were reached 
                                                        
21 Ibid, 88. 
22 Ibid, 91-92. 
23 Palestine Trade Center, Investment in Palestine: The Reality. 
24 “Home” Palestine Industrial Estates & Free Zone Authority, http://www.piefza.ps/en/home  
25 Lagerquist, “Privatizing the Occupation,” 8. 
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and on 14 May 1995 the World Bank proposed backing the Gaza Industrial Estate.26 IFIs 
and national governments viewed the establishment of industrial zones in Palestine 
largely within the framework of neoliberal economics as a solution to political problems. 
Even Bill Clinton remarked, “If you agree to establish industrial zones in the West Bank 
and Gaza and elsewhere, I am prepared to go to Congress and seek approval for 
extending duty-free treatment to products coming out of those zones.”27 On the one hand, 
these zones would strengthen the PA both materially and ideologically, and on the other 
hand, break the Arab boycott on Israel.28 By doing so, the United States and IFIs would 
be able to realize Shimon Peres’ dream of a ‘New Middle East’ built on the shoulders of 
free trade, regional interdependence, and globalization, that would be incorporated into 
the broader ‘New World Order.’29 However, this dream had already sowed the seeds of 
its own destruction, especially for the Palestinians. Whilst the 1994 Protocol on 
Economic Relations was written well within the neoliberal paradigm of the time, it 
nonetheless permitted Israel to have full control over its own border as well as those of 
the Palestinian Authority.30 Moreover, Israel retained control over all Palestinian import 
tax and VAT revenues, freedom of movement, water, and other natural resources.31 Thus, 
the idea of a “New Middle East” defined by ‘interdependence’, ‘good governance’, and 
‘free trade’ materialized into a watered-down marriage of Israeli ‘security concerns’ and 
neoliberalism. In fact, by breaking the Arab boycott through the Protocol on Economic 
Relations, the establishment of industrial zones in the late 1990s accelerated the process 
of the internationalization of Israeli capital far more than promoting Palestinian economic 
development. 
Notwithstanding these internal contradictions and the major security lapses during 
the Second Intifada, IFIs and donor nations were still pushing for the establishment of 
industrial zones in Palestine even after the Second Intifada. For example, a 2004 World 
Bank report noted that the strategy for development in Palestine depended upon “well 
serviced land and supporting infrastructure” in a space subject to a “regulatory regime 
with a minimum of red tape.”32 Whilst the Bank was adamant on building an “efficient 
border crossing regime”, they nonetheless believed that industrial estates on the border 
between Israel and Palestine would attract Palestinian entrepreneurs and foreign investors 
and support “export-based growth.”33 The Bank report makes clear five prerequisites to 
reviving the industrial estates program after its halt during the Second Intifada. They 
expressed the need for (1) “efficient and uninterrupted access of goods”, (2) the 
“maintenance…of linkages with Israeli business and markets”, (3) the use of industrial 
estates as a “springboard to the development of exports to third countries”, (4) providing 
                                                        
26 Gershon Baskin, and Zakaria al-Qaq, A Reevaluation of the Border Industrial Estates Concept 
(Jerusalem: IPCRI, 1998), 2-3. 
27 Quoted in Dana, “The Symbiosis Between Palestinian ‘Fayyadism’ and Israeli ‘Economic Peace,” 470. 
28 Lagerquist, “Privatizing the Occupation,” 9. 
29 Shimon Peres, and Arye Naor, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 1995). 
30 Raja Khalidi, and Sobhi Samour, "Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the 
Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement,” Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy, ed. Mandy 
Turner and Omar Shweiki, 179-199. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.) 
31 Mushtaq Khan, George Giacaman, and Inge Amundsen, State Formation in Palestine. (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 
32 Omer Karasapan and Roby Fields, “Stagnation or Revival? Palestinian Economic Prospects) MENA 
Knowledge and Learning Quick Notes Series; no. 61, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), 1.  
33 Ibid, 1. 
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support to PIEFZA and PIEDCO, and (5) agreeing on a protocol between Israelis and 
Palestinians that would “take advantage of the free zone provisions under the PIEFZL.”34  
Though the authors of the report seem sceptical of the industrial estate program’s 
prospects of success, its recommendations prove to be problematic as well. In the context 
of deteriorating relations between Palestinian and Israeli elites (especially under the 
Likud government), the likelihood of uninterrupted access of goods seems like a pipe 
dream in the absence of a comprehensive political solution to the conflict. Moreover, 
even if this were to occur, its benefits seem somewhat limited.  
The report also emphasizes the importance of maintaining linkages with Israeli 
business. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, although the Palestinian economy 
has collaborated (and likely will have to continue to do so) with the Israeli economy, it 
seems highly problematic to call for further economic integration between the Occupier 
and the Occupied. Without reaching a political solution, economic integration between 
Israeli/foreign capital and Palestinian labour, coupled with a rent-seeking Palestinian 
political-elite, will serve only to weaken any prospects for effective development and 
deepen the occupier’s control over Palestinian economic and social life.35  
Secondly, the entire developmental strategy of relying on Israeli business is 
flawed. A brief historical analysis proves this point. Due to security concerns and Israeli 
domestic restrictions, it is not particularly easy for Israeli business to invest in industrial 
zones/estates that are under full Palestinian control. As noted earlier, since the Oslo 
Accords served the interests of Israeli capital by breaking the Arab boycott, Israeli and 
Arab economic relations began to integrate more rapidly. The Oslo Accords, coupled 
with the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, created an environment for further 
economic integration, resulting in an agreement brokered by the US between Israel and 
Jordan on Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ). QIZs are special EPZs that allow jointly 
manufactured goods to enter the US market without import restrictions as long as they 
contain a certain Israeli input. Moreover, Egypt joined the QIZ agreement in 2004, 
further intensifying the trend towards Arab and Israeli integration. Because of lower 
labour costs and fewer security risks in Jordan and Egypt, a feasibility study for the 
Nablus Industrial Estate noted that “the QIZ in Irbid and the other QIZs to be designated 
within Jordan and Egypt will be direct competitors.”36 In fact, many small Palestinian 
businessmen who relied on Israel for subcontracting were deprived of their income as 
manufacturing relocated to Jordan and Egypt. As Bouillon notes, the relocation of 
manufacturing to Jordan proved to be so successful that “outsourcing industrial 
production there often replaced industrial collaboration with Palestinian firms in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.”37  Therefore, relying on the Israeli business community in an 
increasingly globalized production landscape only served to hurt smaller Palestinian 
businesses.  
In spite of this, Palestinian political elites, like those associated with the Palestine 
Industrial Estate Development and Management Company (PIEDCO), still believed that 
                                                        
34 Ibid, 6-7. 
35 Adam Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago: 
Haymarket Books, 2013), 122.  
36 Palestine Industrial Estate and Free Zone Authority, “Nablus Industrial Estate Feasibility Study,” 3-16.  
37 Bouillon, The Peace Business, 152. 
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“Palestinian products could withstand the pressure of rivalry.”38 This statement is hardly 
surprising as the stakes for the post-Oslo Palestinian capitalist class were far lower than 
for small Palestinian business owners. For example, the Fakhoury family that helped 
develop the Jenin Industrial Estate nonetheless benefitted from the relocation of capital 
away from Palestine to Jordan because they were heavily invested into the QIZ business 
in Jordan.39 Unlike small Palestinian business owners who were completely dependent on 
Israeli subcontractual relations, the wealthier Palestinian political-economic elite 
acquired more rents from IFIs and donor agencies for establishing more industrial 
estates.40 In a sense, it did not matter whether the estates were successful or not – it 
mattered only that these estates were heavily subsidized.  
Lastly, the World Bank’s recommendations regarding support for the Palestinian 
Industrial Estate and Free Zone Authority (PIEFZA) and PIEDCO, in addition to taking 
advantage of the free zone laws, seem to accelerate the trend towards greater social 
inequality in Palestine. By strengthening the transnational Palestinian capitalist class via 
subsidies and political legitimization, IFIs and donor agencies serve to strengthen a 
neopatrimonial Palestinian proto-state. As Brynen notes, in this neopatrimonial order the 
boundaries between “public role and private interest” are constantly blurred, public office 
enables private rent-seeking, and “state resources are used to lubricate patron-client 
networks.”41 In fact, Bouillon argues that it was precisely this neopatrimonial order that 
contributed significantly to the public indignation in the lead up to the Second Intifada.42  
However, this neopatrimonialism must not be conceived of in a historical 
vacuum. Rather, as Tariq Dana argues, it denotes a “locally influential political-economic 
elite that is tied into the global system economically, ideologically and politically.”43 
Therefore, it is crucial that we understand the development of industrial zones in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip as both symptomatic of, and contributory to, social, 
economic, and political inequality. In a highly globalized context, Palestinian political-
economic elites were well-positioned to channel rents from IFIs and donor agencies, 
whereas small business owners and workers bore the brunt of exploitation, and worse, 
economic deprivation when manufacturing relocated from the Occupied Territories to 
Jordan and Egypt. 
Therefore, it is clear that the establishment of industrial zones was pushed heavily 
by Palestinian elites and IFIs in the context of the Oslo Accords, neoliberal globalization, 
and a vision for the new ‘New Middle East.’ However, this historical analysis has 
demonstrated that the agreements reached, especially the 1994 Protocol on Economic 
Relations, always favoured the Israelis over the Palestinians. Moreover, relying on Israeli 
businesses as a source of capital in light of increasing globalization and relocation of 
manufacturing proved to be an ineffectual developmental strategy. Lastly, strengthening 
the power of Palestinian economic elites through financial subsidies and aid also 
reinforced structures of social, political, and economic inequality that are ultimately at 
                                                        
38 Ibid, 73. 
39 Ibid, 89. 
40 Toufic Haddad, Palestine Ltd: Neoliberalism and Nationalism in the Occupied Territory (New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2016). 
41 Rex Brynen, "The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian politics." Journal of Palestine Studies 25, 
no. 1 (1995): 25. 
42 Bouillon, The Peace Business, 146. 
43 Dana, The Symbiosis Between Palestinian ‘Fayyadism’ and Israeli ‘Economic Peace, 457. 
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odds with a coherent and popular national economic program. Hence, although 
Palestinian elites may have benefitted from the rents associated with the establishment of 
industrial zones, this did not materialize into effective economic development for the 
Palestinian Territories as a whole. Let us now turn to how industrial zones have 
developed in more recent years after the Second Intifada came to an end under the 
administration of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.  
 
Industrial Zones, Fayyadism, and the PRDP 
 
An overview of the political economy under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and his 
developmental paradigm also illustrates the failure of preconditioning economic 
development on neoliberal reform, increasing foreign ownership, and the Occupier’s 
goodwill. The enthusiasm for building industrial estates and free zones was once again 
reignited under Prime Minister Salam Fayyad (2007-2013). This period, in terms of its 
policy positions and wider ideology, is often termed ‘Fayyadism.’ Although it does not 
represent a radical departure from PA policies of the 1990s, it does entail a further shift 
towards economic normalization, neoliberal fiscal and monetary reforms, security reform 
and cooperation, privatization, and rhetorical calls for ‘good governance’ and 
transparency.44 Fayyad himself, educated largely in the United States, cut his teeth at the 
World Bank from 1987 to 1995, and then at the IMF from 1996 to 2001. In the eyes of 
the United States and IFIs, he seemed like ‘their kind of guy.’ He acceded to all the 
economic and political positions promoted by IFIs, subscribed to the US-Israeli project of 
‘A New Middle East’, and seemed willing to work with the United States and Israel.  
One of the most important documents that Fayyad authored alongside the World 
Bank was the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010 (PRDP). This sought 
to achieve four primary objectives – “safety and security”, “good governance”, 
“increased national prosperity”, and “enhanced quality of life” – through a PA monopoly 
on violence to deter Hamas and neoliberal economic reform to attract foreign capital and 
secure further donor funding.45 This proposal emanated from a conference that took place 
on 17 December 2007 where over 90 representatives from donor agencies and countries 
pledged their support for the PA. Chaired by the French and Norwegian governments, 
former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the European Commission, the attendees 
pledged over $7.7 billion to the PA.46  The close links between IFIs and Palestinian 
political-economic elites in dictating Palestinian economic policy is clear. As Adam 
Hanieh notes, “the first thing to note about the PRDP is that the heavy hand of the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund … can be clearly seen in its policy 
recommendations and outlook.”47 In fact, the $7.7 billion earmarked for the PA was 
conditional on the PRDP’s implementation. In addition to cutting public sector jobs by 
21% (except for the security sector, where $257 million in funding was secured), 
reducing the wage bill, ending subsidies on electricity and water (which would adversely 
affect the poor), the PRDP proposed the continued establishment of these same border 
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industrial zones in Jenin, Jericho, and Tarqumiyah, and municipal industrial parks in 
Tulkarem and Hebron.48  
This plan exhibited numerous flaws from the start. First, the fact that these zones 
remained incomplete yet are still being promoted signals a strategy that is based on 
consistently rehashing unsuccessful projects. Additionally, the PRDP highlighted the 
expansion of foreign funding to develop such zones. Germany, Japan, France, and Turkey 
pledged to substantially develop the border industrial zones. Japan pledged 
approximately $50 million to the Jericho-Agro Industrial Park, Germany provided $14 
million in soft loans, and has pledged to provide another $40 million for the Jenin 
Industrial Free Zone. France offered a 50% grant for French machinery, and a 50% 
guaranteed loan for infrastructural development at the Bethlehem Industrial Estate.49 
Moreover, a concession agreement that was leaked in 2012 revealed that the land rights 
for the Jenin Industrial Free Zone were set to be transferred to the Turkish firm, Tobb-Bis 
Industrial Parks Management Company – though this has yet to happen.50 In sum, the 
zones were set to function as offshore nodes facilitating the expansion of global capital, 
whilst simultaneously legitimizing Palestinian elites as nation-builders, harbingers of 
effective development, and practitioners of ‘good governance.’ 
Another problem concerning the PRDP and its advocacy for establishing these 
industrial zones is the issue of free movement within the context of occupation. A 2008 
progress report acknowledged that “closure of Gaza by the Government of Israel (GOI) 
and the continued impediments to access and movement in the West Bank” was the 
primary obstacle to economic development.51  The report notes that Israel had yet to 
provide free access and movement from planned industrial zones within area A, which 
was supposed to be under full PA control (see footnote for explanation).52 Moreover, the 
PRDP called for the establishment of the Tarqumiyah zone that is to be built on area C. It 
seems contradictory to repeatedly advocate for the building of industrial zones on lands 
that fall in area C given that even those built on area A fail to guarantee the free 
movement of goods and people. In essence, the developmental program at hand depended 
upon the Occupier’s goodwill. 
The question of labour and employment has proven problematic in this plan. The 
PRDP posited that the industrial zones will directly employ 40,000 workers and create 
another 40,000 in indirect jobs, meaning that 20% of jobs in the Occupied Territories will 
be associated with such industrial zones. However, for all the talk of job promotion and 
raising standards of living, the main trade union body in the Palestinian Territories, the 
Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU), has not been given the right to 
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represent workers in the zones. 53  This highlights the trend towards a labour-hostile 
environment and a ‘race to the bottom’ for wages in an already tumultuous political 
situation. Moreover, in light of the experiences of the Gaza Industrial Estate (GIE), there 
is reason to be suspicious of these employment projections. Established in 1998, the 
World Bank hoped that the GIE would directly create some 16,000 jobs by 2005 in 
addition to 30,000 indirect jobs. In reality, the GIE only employed 6.6% of its direct 
employment target and 5.3% of its indirect employment target. It was also unable to 
provide a genuine alternative to wage-work in Israel as both the average unskilled and 
skilled wage at the estate was lower than the average Palestinian wage in Israel proper.54 
In fact, Israeli firms ‘outsourced’ production to the estate where both labour costs and tax 
rates were lower. Additionally, Israeli security concerns were assuaged as this type of 
production no longer required the inflow of Palestinians into Israel proper. Last, since 
many of these jobs were often low value-added textile jobs that were subcontracting for 
Israeli firms, they had little effect on local Palestinian capital accumulation. Though one 
cannot superimpose the experiences of the GIE onto other zones, that fact that the PRDP 
continues to champion the GIE and the industrial zone model as a successful 
developmental blueprint for Palestine is nonetheless concerning. 
In sum, the PRDP and the underlying peace process have only legitimized the 
elites as nation-state builders in the eyes of the international community. Additionally, it 
has reified elite decision-making bodies and institutions as the principal channels through 
which development is practiced, regardless of whether they reflect needs of Palestinians. 
This seems to be a prime example of a peace process that depends upon “inter-elite 
political accommodations whose aim is often not so much ‘peace’ as the reconfiguration 
of domestic hegemony and/or international legitimacy,” as Jan Selby has noted.55  
In effect, the growing influence of IFIs and foreign capital vis-à-vis the PRDP, 
accelerates the process of undemocratic economic planning. Since Palestinian political-
economic elites owe their class position to integrating with foreign capital, they certainly 
stood to benefit from the PRDP. Moreover, that industrial zones were always dependent 
on foreign funding and, in some cases, the commercialization of Palestinian land, 
indicates a developmental strategy at play that prioritizes the interests of capital, donor 
agencies, and rent-seekers. Furthermore, the PRDP, like previous reports from IFIs, 
internalized the Occupation and ensured that development was contingent on the 
Occupier’s goodwill. Lastly, a lack of cooperation with trade unions on extensive 
economic programs is indicative of the fact that these political-economic projects were 
elite-centered. However, it was not solely the industrial zones, but rather the entire PRDP 
package that strengthened the neopatrimonial Palestinian state and their repressive status 
apparatus at the expense of a more egalitarian economic strategy. 
While the history of the industrial zones in Palestine is crucial for understanding 
wider regional and global contexts as well as decision-making processes involved, this 
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article will now provide a spatial analysis of industrial zones in Palestine to highlight 
some elements in a wider political and economic project that is being increasingly 
defined by political, economic, and spatial fragmentation. 
 
 
Spatial Analysis of Industrial Zones in Palestine 
 
Drawing upon frameworks established in the field of critical geography will elucidate the 
relationship between social class and social space in Palestine in order to assess whether 
these zones promote economic development. To do so, I will focus on (i) the economic 
implications of location and geography of the zones, (ii) land dispossession and 
environmental concerns, (iii) increasing Israeli control over Palestinian social and 
economic life, and (iv) projections of territorial sovereignty as class power. The focus 
will be on the Jericho-Agro Industrial Park (JAIP), the Bethlehem Industrial Estate (BIE), 
the Jenin Industrial Free Zone (JIFZ), and the Tarqumiyah Industrial Estate (TIE).  
 
Economic Implications of Location 
 
Firstly, it is important to investigate the economic implications of the Palestinian 
industrial zones’ geography. Doing so will assist us in explaining how they function 
within the Palestinian economy, and in turn, their developmental implications.  
The Jericho-Agro Industrial Park (JAIP), which began operating in September 
2013, is located on the south side of Jericho’s border from Al-Nabi Moussa Land, on the 
southern fringe of the Jericho Municipality, occupying approximately 1,115,000m2.56 
Clearly, judging from the location near the Jordanian border and according to the final 
feasibility study, the JAIP is intended to primarily export its agro-industrial produce to 
Gulf and European markets.57  In 2011, Israel approved the request from the JAIP’s 
developers to build an access road from the Allenby Bridge (connecting the West Bank to 
Jordan) to the industrial park.58 Thus, even the geographical location of the zone itself is 
indicative of neoliberal orthodoxy – produce for export is prioritized even though 
Palestine suffers from a lack of food sovereignty. According to Wilson and Bruins 
(2005), the food security for the Palestinian Territories was rated as ‘very low.’59 They 
received a score of 43 on the Food Security Index, which ranges between -40 and 50, 
with 50 being the most insecure. Further, out of all the Middle Eastern countries 
surveyed, only Jordan ranked below Palestine.60 In effect, the enclave-like nature of the 
zone located on the border of the West Bank ultimately creates few linkages with the rest 
of the local economy and accelerates the trend towards further food insecurity.  
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Moreover, its location in the Jordan Valley has significant implications for the 
local agricultural industry. According to PIEFZA, this projection of territorial sovereignty 
via the establishment of the JAIP is necessary in order “to revive Palestinian valleys areas 
that are threatened with confiscation and settlement.” 61  Whilst the threat of land 
confiscation by Israeli authorities and settlers is evidently real, Palestinian elites and their 
foreign counterparts utilize this fear to justify their own economic projects based on these 
genuine concerns. However, according to a 2007 Stop The Wall Campaign report, rather 
than protecting small farmers who make up the vast majority of economic activity in the 
Jordan Valley, donor agencies envisage a situation where farmers will work as wage-
labourers in large-scale agro-industry, in turn, producing surplus value for international 
capital.62 Writing on the growth of the ‘offshore economy,’ Palan notes “the perceived 
threat of relocation and decline [or, in this case, confiscation], whether real or not, was 
seized upon to rationalize and restructure power relationships in the center.”63 Therefore, 
this spatial dynamic can also be viewed as an effect produced by class power, which aims 
to project political and economic control over certain territories, in turn, channeling 
surpluses to domestic and international ruling coalitions.64 
This dynamic is certainly not unique to the JAIP. The Jenin Industrial Free Zone 
(JIFZ), located 3km from the Jenin city centre, also lies near the northern border with 
Israel (see figure 1). As seen in figure 1, the JIFZ is to be established next to the Al-
Jalameh security checkpoint but its potential to successfully export out of the territories 
and into Israel seems unattainable. Haifa, the closest main Israeli city to Jenin, is only 45 
kilometers away. However, as a feasibility report notes, a ‘good’ total travel time (in 
times of peace) would be 648 minutes and a ‘bad’ time (in times of political turmoil) to 
be 1026 minutes.65  Thus, whilst these zones were planned to satisfy the space-time 
compression needs of global capitalism (condensing spatial and temporal distances to 
speed up the circulation of capital) by being ‘outside’ of the Occupation and exploiting 
cheap labour, the extremely lengthy travel times are indicative of its own failures.66 Once 
again, if we consider seriously the exorbitant transport times and costs, it seems only 
‘reasonable’ for firms to relocate their manufacturing to QIZs in Jordan and Egypt. 
Therefore, even on the zone’s own terms – a successful export processing zone – the 
project seems uncompetitive in a globalized economy and does not promote Palestinian 
economic development.  
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Land Dispossession, Land Rights, and Environmental Concerns 
 
Since the establishment of industrial zones depends on relatively large swathes of 
territory, it is important to explore the developmental implications of land dispossession 
and land rights associated with their construction. By analyzing cases of both land 
appropriation and environmental issues, it will become clear that elite concerns and 
foreign interests are prioritized over the needs of the local economy, especially that of 
agriculture. 
In terms of land dispossession and land rights, the Jenin Industrial Free Zone 
(JIFZ) is the most concerning. When the PA decided to build the zone, some families 
sold their land, totaling approximately 500 dunams (1 dunam = 1000m2). However, this 
was not sufficient for the establishment of the zone as five families refused to sell their 
land to the PA. In 2000, the PA then proceeded to appropriate 933 dunams of land from 
the farmers and transferred it to PIEFZA in the name of ‘public use.’67 At the time, 
farmers filed a lawsuit against President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, claiming that 
the land appropriation would destroy local agriculture in the region.68 PIEFZA did obtain 
the land and will be overseeing the project, but the land rights were set to be transferred 
to the Turkish firm, TOBB-BIS. To borrow Palan’s term, this can be described as the 
‘commercialization of sovereignty’ where “offshore jurisdictions are offering sovereign 
protection or a right of abode, whether real or fictional, and using this as a source of 
revenue.”69 The bitter irony is that the PA already faces many challenges to establish 
sovereignty over the Occupied Territories, and the re-territorialization of Palestinian land 
into something that operates above the state level for global capital is indicative not of the 
irrelevancy of the Palestinian state, but rather, of its class dynamics. Whether the aim of 
transferring land rights was because of financial constraints or not, it nonetheless 
demonstrates that PA elites are beholden to the dictates of international capital and not 
accountable to the people they are supposed to represent. As Arang Keshavarzian notes in 
his study of free zones in Dubai and Iran, these zones function as “gated fiefdoms for 
private interests and extraction of surplus by economic and foreign interests. Willing or 
not, public law is rendered as a mere tool of private interests.” 70  The process of 
establishing industrial zones in Palestine indicates a willingness on the part of Palestinian 
elites to disregard local developmental projects, carve out small pockets of territory for 
global capital to accumulate, and create revenue streams from such land transfers.  
Another set of issues that arise with the development of such zones/estates on 
Palestinian land are those related to environmental and health concerns. According to a 
2009 environmental and social impact assessment of the Bethlehem Industrial Estate 
(BIE), there are many causes of concern regarding the establishment of the estate. As 
seen in figure 2, the estate takes over large swathes of field crops and is adjacent to two 
olive fields. The report notes that it is possible that acid rain resulting from industrial 
pollution may “contaminate drinking water and vegetation, damage aquatic life, and 
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erode buildings.”71 Moreover, owing to the westerly and northwesterly wind direction, 
“most of the eastern part of Hindazah inhabitants (about 2000 people) as well as all of 
Beit Ta'mir inhabitants will be affected by air pollution (580 people).”72 Furthermore, the 
majority of inhabitants in the area believed that the presence of the BIE would adversely 
affect their own agricultural projects (see figure 3). The report also concludes that “the 
proposed industrial park construction will create negative impacts” on noise and 
vibration, dust from earth works, problems on access roads and traffic jams, runoff 
erosion from cut and fill areas, fumes from excavation, displacement of workers and 
farmers, destruction of significant agricultural land use, and possible impact of the al 
Khirba archaeological site.73  
Whilst industrial development usually entails some form of environmental and/or 
health problems, one of the biggest concerns is the effect on local agriculture. Once 
again, as noted earlier, since Palestine already suffers greatly from food insecurity, any 
destruction to local agriculture must be viewed seriously and scrutinized. The fact that 
local inhabitants felt that the industrial estate would adversely affect agriculture is 
testament to the PA’s undemocratic economic planning. Moreover, it seems only to fall 
under what Marxist geographer David Harvey terms ‘accumulation by dispossession’ – a 
process that includes the “commodification and privatization of land and the forceful 
expulsion of peasant population; conversion of various forms of property rights into 
exclusive private property rights; suppression of rights to the commons; commodification 
of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and 
consumption.”74 As Marx notes in the Grundrisse, “capital by its nature drives beyond 
every spatial barrier.”75 In the case of the BIE, French and Palestinian capital, along with 
aid from IFIs, functions the same way. Inhabitants’ concerns and local agriculture, which 
functioned as barriers to the expansion of capital, are disregarded and removed to pave 
the way for new forms of capital accumulation. For example, the only company to 
operate at the BIE thus far is the French firm Schneider Electric.76  
In turn, by removing farmers from their land, they are then forced to enter the 
labour market to work for wages whilst other Palestinians who work in the estate produce 
surplus-value for foreign capital that is rarely reinvested back into the local economy. 
Instead, the capital is siphoned off to France, with PA elites extracting rents from these 
business operations. In effect, these zones are spatial strategies to further maximize profit 
for foreign capital. As Keller Easterling writes, “today we might understand the zone to 
be the embassy or parliament of the elite parastate corporation, the site of multinational 
and offshore headquartering and the spatial instrument for externalizing obstacles to 
profit.” 77  Therefore, rather than accommodating indigenous forms of production and 
consumption, industrial zones represent a process whereby land rights serve the interests 
                                                        
71 Hammad et al, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment and Action Plan (ESIAAP) for Bethlehem 
Multi Industrial Park (BMIP), 38. 
72 Ibid, 39. 
73 Ibid, 33-34. 
74 David Harvey, Spaces of Global Capitalism. (London: Verso, 2006) 43. 
75 Karl Marx, Grundrisse. (London: Penguin, 1993), 524.  
76 “Schneider Electric Opening,” Bethlehem Multidisciplinary Industrial Park 
http://bmipbethlehem.com/index.php/our-news/item/80-schneider-electric-opening. 
77 Keller Easterling, "Zone: The Spatial Softwares of Extrastatecraft." Places Journal (2012). 
New Middle Eastern Studies 7 (2017) 
17 
of foreign capital, Palestinian economic-elites, and the pursuit of profit at the expense of 
the local Palestinian economy. 
 
Navigating the Occupation, Israeli Biopower, and Securitized Development 
 
Another issue associated with the development of industrial zones in Palestine is that of 
the Israeli Occupation. There is no doubt that the Occupation is the most pervasive 
structure permeating economic, social, and political life in the Palestinian territories. 
Therefore, even though industrial zones were designed to function ‘outside’ the 
Occupation, the evidence suggests the contrary. Rather than resisting occupation, this 
section will demonstrate that industrial zones in fact seem to normalize and integrate with 
aspects of the Occupation, create more markets for the Israeli security industry in the 
West Bank, and reinforce Israeli biopower on the ground.  
Through an examination of some crucial spatial aspects of the PA-sponsored 
industrial zones, the ways in which they are preconditioned on structures of occupation 
will become evidently clear. For example, in 2003, the Israeli military confiscated some 
of the land for the establishment of the JIFZ in order to build the Separation Wall and for 
a ‘buffer-zone.’78 Hanieh writes that the Wall will form the northern border of the zone.79 
Therefore, rather than simply functioning as a hub for global capital, the zone will now 
also architecturally depend upon the Separation Wall – arguably the most visible feature 
of the Israeli Occupation. This is in fact extremely problematic from the perspective of 
Palestinian national liberation and development since the Occupation has severely 
hindered attempts to promote Palestinian economic development.80 In turn, this example 
demonstrates that neoliberal forces in Palestine become actualized both economically and 
spatially through a structural coupling with (material) structures of occupation. 
The Jericho-Agro Industrial Park (JAIP) poses a similar problem, though not as 
directly as the previous example. According to a report from Stop The Wall Campaign, 
officials from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which is financing 
most of the JAIP’s costs, told news agencies that it plans to build the Al-Mujarat road 
that will link Jericho to Palestinian towns in the north and the south.81 However, the road 
cuts straight through Highway 45, which links Jericho to Jerusalem for Palestinians. In 
turn, this may further entrench the divisions of the West Bank into three separate 
enclaves, thereby accelerating the process of spatial fragmentation and the separation of 
Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank.82 Moreover, a report from the Bisan Center for 
Research and Development noted that the “Jericho Agro-Industrial Park may improve 
agriculture in the project area, but it was also designed to improve exports to the Jordan 
Valley [Israeli] settlements and improve their status.” 83  If it is the case that both 
Palestinian and international funding to a project may aid illegal settlements in the West 
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Bank, then this is clearly a cause for concern. It seems to normalize the Occupation and 
the gradual colonization of the West Bank, which is completely at odds with Palestinian 
national liberation and development.  
Lastly, according to a 2011-12 report from the Coordination of Government 
Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Israeli officials approved of building access roads 
for the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park, the Jenin Industrial Free Zone, and for the 
Bethlehem Industrial Estate.84 COGAT describes itself as “responsible for implementing 
the government's policy in Judea and Samaria and vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip” and argues 
that it “constitutes the civilian authority for residential zoning and infrastructure and is 
responsible for addressing the needs of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.”85 While it 
is impossible to ignore the Occupation, it is nonetheless concerning that COGAT acts as 
the final arbiter of Palestinian developmental projects. It must be stressed that a 
developmental strategy whereby Palestinian developers have to accommodate the needs 
of COGAT for Palestinian projects is not viable. Moreover, these requests are not trivial 
in nature – according to the report, the access road for the BIE is set to cost $22.7 million, 
and the one at the JAIP to be approximately $13 million, and so the opportunity costs of 
these projects are extremely high.86  
The reinforcement of Israeli biopower is another controversial issue relating to the 
establishment of industrial zones as this reinforcement has negative developmental 
implications for the Palestinian economy. Biopower, coined by Michel Foucault, is a 
technology of power whereby “the basic biological features of the human species became 
the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power.”87 Moreover, he notes 
that it entails “numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies 
and the control of populations.” 88  Some examples of Israeli biopower that will be 
examined include the imposition of ID cards, restrictions on movement, and control over 
key Palestinian resources like land and water. 
As most of the zones are established near the ‘borders’ and goods need to cross 
these Israeli-controlled borders and checkpoints for export, they become necessarily 
integrated into Israeli control over Palestinian life. As Dana notes, “given the priority of 
security, restrictive measures will apply on movement in and out of the industrial 
zones.”89 For example, a feasibility study for the JIFZ described how Palestinian truck 
drivers need special permits in order to pass through fixed checkpoints. However, the 
only way to obtain a special permit is for the driver to possess an Israeli ID card, which in 
turn, imposes restriction on civil status, age, and residential location.90 Therefore, even 
though these zones purport to be outside of the Occupation, the imposition of ID cards 
demonstrates, firstly, that the zones do not function outside the Occupation, and more 
importantly that Israeli authorities are able to dictate who has the sufficient 
‘requirements’ to be a driver. Furthermore, at the JAIP, transport services “will require 
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vehicles and drivers registered at security in order to avoid unnecessary disturbances at 
checkpoints.” 91  In essence, the zones, whilst heavily securitized and approved by 
occupational authorities, still function very much within the confines of the Occupation. 
This phenomenon is neither unique nor new to the JIFZ. In the early 1990s, IDs were 
imposed on all Palestinians working within the Erez Industrial Estate (EIE) in Gaza, 
further intensifying the process of the bureaucratization of Palestinian life. 92  As 
Lagerquist notes, “in what was to prove an enduring legacy, development came to mean 
that Palestinians became closely monitored guests in their own economy.”93 In effect, the 
establishments of industrial zones that necessitate the imposition of ID cards then become 
spatially integrated into the surrounding architecture of the Occupation. 
In addition to the restrictions and control over the movement of Palestinian 
bodies, the development of industrial zones in Palestine are also determined by Israel’s 
control over key Palestinian resources such as land and water.94 Most of the industrial 
zones, especially the JAIP and the Tarqumiyah Industrial Estate (TIE), are designed to 
include territory that fall under Area C (see footnote for explanation of Areas A, B, and 
C). Although all the zones require Israeli approval at some level, it is much more difficult 
to obtain approval for planning on Area C and transforming that territory into Area B. 
Thus, the third phase of the JAIP, which is located on Area C, has been the most difficult 
to initiate because of Israeli security concerns. Moreover, although the PA and their 
financiers may assert significant influence over economic policy and planning, 
negotiations with the government of Israel are a constant reminder of who is truly in 
control. The Israeli authorities are always the final arbiters in the re-territorialization of 
Palestinian land.95 In addition to land issues, Al-Monitor reported that Mekorot, Israel’s 
national water company, will provide the bulk of the water supply to the JIFZ – 
approximately 530,000 gallons a day.96 Aside from supplying Israel with 90% of its 
water, Mekorot also provides water to most illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. 
Thus, whilst it is clearly difficult to establish independent water sources in the West 
Bank, the zone nonetheless legitimates Mekorot as a suitable contractor for a Palestinian 
entity, which in turn, has significant implications if a future Palestinian economic strategy 
is to include boycotting Israeli companies that participate in the process of settlement 
expansion. 
Lastly, the process of development in accordance with Israeli security concerns 
creates an unsettling dynamic for Palestinian economic development. Due to the nature of 
industrial zones, their reliance on Israeli approval, and their spatial configuration within a 
heavily territorialized conflict, the issue of security is a guiding concept in their 
development. Security is without a doubt prioritized so as not to deter wary investors. For 
example, the JAIP will at the minimum “consist of fencing, cameras, patrolling cars and 
control monitoring.”97 A feasibility report for the JIFZ notes that “the entire area will be 
                                                        
91 Japan International Cooperation Agency, Feasibility Study on Agro-industrial Park Development in the 
Jordan River Rift Valley, S-7. 
92 Lagerquist, Privatizing the Occupation, 8. 
93 Ibid, 8. 
94 Dana, The Symbiosis Between Palestinian ‘Fayyadism’ and Israeli ‘Economic Peace’, 473. 
95 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 2007), 405. 
96 Melhem, Palestinian Industrial Parks: Boon or Bondage? 
97 Japan International Cooperation Agency, Feasibility Study on Agro-industrial Park Development in the 
Jordan River Rift Valley, S-18. 
New Middle Eastern Studies 7 (2017) 
20 
fenced and the movement of goods and people…will be checked and regulated.” 98 
Moreover, the zone aims to introduce a video surveillance system, a dome camera with a 
360° view, infrared night-lighting system, and an infrared barrier anti-intrusion system. 
While these features may seem like essentials to any industrial zone, the fact that the 
projected security cost is approximately €2 million, with much of this having to be 
purchased from Israeli security firms, serves to benefit Israeli capital and strengthen the 
asymmetrical relationship between Israel and Palestine in military and security matters.  
Purchasing Israeli security services is highly problematic, as the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip are viewed in spatial terms as ‘laboratories’ for Israel to test its security 
‘products.’99 Additionally, the relationships between the zones and Israeli security firms 
are not always so indirect. The Gaza Industrial Estate (GIE), established in 1998, directly 
subcontracted out its security to the Israeli firm, NETACS, which has close ties to the 
IDF.100 This further highlights the notion that any unilateral action taken by the PA 
remains subject to Israeli security concerns, and that even highly territorialized enclaves 
of economic activity remain integrated within the dynamics of the Occupation’s 
architecture.  
In sum, this analysis has illustrated that the industrial zones in Palestine do not 
function outside the Occupation, contrary to the designs of PA elites and IFIs. In actual 
fact, the construction of some of the industrial zones, especially the JIFZ, actually 
depends upon structures of the Occupation. Moreover, in some cases, aspects of their 
construction, such as access roads, have significant spatial implications that may further 
intensify the trend towards fragmentation of the West Bank, and in turn, a non-
contiguous Palestinian state. Lastly, by preconditioning developmental projects on Israeli 
security concerns and endorsing the Israeli security industry undoubtedly has 
controversial implications for the future of a secure Palestinian state, free from 
occupation.  
 
Projections of Territorial Sovereignty as Class Power 
 
Hitherto, the analysis has exemplified the inability of industrial zones to promote 
Palestinian economic development by examining the spatial aspects of individual zones, 
largely in isolation to one another. Whilst drawing upon the arguments above in addition 
to two neo-Marxist frameworks, this section shall take a more macro-view of industrial 
zones in Palestine in order to elucidate the relationship between social space and social 
class. In doing so, this section will argue that industrial zones function as projections of 
territorial sovereignty produced by class power present within the Palestinian proto-state. 
In turn, Palestinian elites are creating a future socio-economic landscape that is highly 
fragmented and rife with inequality. 
One of the formative concepts surrounding the establishment of free trade zones, 
not just in Palestine, but also throughout the world, is the notion of asserting territorial 
sovereignty in unstable areas. Arang Keshavarzian, writing on free trade zones in Dubai 
and Iran, establishes a useful framework for understanding the functionality of such 
zones. He writes that zones are developed to “project territorial sovereignty in turbulent 
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geostrategic settings and moments as well as nodes to circulate rent to domestic and 
international members of ruling coalitions.”101 Another constructive framework that this 
section shall draw upon is the notion of a ‘spatial fix’ coined by Marxist geographer 
David Harvey. He describes a ‘spatial fix’ as “capitalism’s insatiable drive to resolve its 
inner crisis tendencies by geographical expansion and geographical restructuring.”102 
These two frameworks will be utilized to further examine the relationship between social 
space and class in contemporary Palestine, and in turn, to shed light on the elite-centered 
spatial project. 
In response to the Israeli Occupation and the unpredictable security environment, 
Palestinian elites are creating heavily securitized enclaves that service the interests of 
foreign capital. In turn, elites seek to control defined territories, establish themselves 
within circuits of international production, collect rents from these operations, and hope 
that such operations provide them legitimacy and support from their populace. Because 
the Occupation seeps into all aspects of Palestinian life, the industrial zones were 
designed to function outside the reach of the Occupation. However, as the analysis has 
demonstrated thus far, this is clearly not the case. Moreover, by building such zones as 
supposedly ‘outside’ the Occupation, elites legitimize themselves as nation-builders and 
are able to claim that these territorial enclaves are irrefutably Palestinian. The only thing 
truly Palestinian about these zones, however, is that they rely upon the exploitation of 
local Palestinian labour. Furthermore, the industrial zones also function as a spatial fix, in 
that the geographical restructuring (i.e. building industrial zones) is utilized as a way to 
temporarily resolve both the political and economic crises that plague the Occupied 
Territories. Since many of the zones’ planners felt that these enclaves would be ‘closure-
proof’ (though this turned out to be wrong), they sought to construct a spatial topography 
in Palestine where certain territories could service the needs of capital in spaces that were 
‘outside’ of the Occupation whilst also relying on exploiting the pool of cheap local 
Palestinian labour. Rather than actually solving the underlying political issues however, 
the re-territorialization of Palestinian land attempts to simply transfer the crisis 
elsewhere. In effect, the zones function as economic solutions to political problems.  
Whilst the zones function as projections of territorial sovereignty in response to 
the surrounding Israeli Occupation, they also seek to spatially re-configure themselves at 
a global level by integrating with global production chains and the wider world economy. 
Capital is often non-Palestinian, profits are hardly reinvested back into the Palestinian 
economy, few linkages with the domestic economy are created, and most products are 
produced for export rather than domestic consumption. In a sense, the zones are territorial 
reflections of the Palestinian capitalist class – their transnational character mirrors the 
spatial level on which the zones function. In turn, the zones help the transnational 
Palestinian capitalists class and PA elites integrate further into the wider global economy. 
Aside from simply strengthening the Palestinian capitalist class’ position within the 
international circuit, they also reify and entrench the internationalization of capital as a 
process. More specifically, the internationalization of capital is mediated precisely 
through offshore strategies, as evidenced by lax regulations, removal of tariffs and 
quotas, and free movement of capital and profits. In turn, offshore strategies become 
some of the main ways in which the onshore economy is structured. As Palan notes, 
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“offshore then became the whip with which capital ensured that onshore did not stray off 
the beaten track.”103 In sum, the zones must be viewed conceptually as products of elites 
engaging with the world economy, in particular response to the ensnaring Israeli 
Occupation. 104  Therefore, by creating small, disparate pockets of economic activity 
‘outside’ of the Occupation, Palestinian elites seek to fuse the local with the global as a 
source of political and economic power.  
The establishment of industrial zones, however, is just one feature within the 
wider social, political, and economic landscape that is emerging in contemporary 
Palestine. This landscape is being increasingly defined by spatial fragmentation and 
uneven development that both accommodates and serves the interests of foreign capital 
and Palestinian elites. Other features include the new planned city of Rawabi (designed 
by Munib al-Masri’s nephew, financed largely by Gulf capital, and intended to house 
upper-class Palestinians) and the construction of luxury hotels like the Movenpick in 
Ramallah. These projects are defining elements of a wider development strategy that 
seeks to build disparate clusters of economic activity outside of the Occupation. Once 
again, they fit Harvey’s notion of a ‘spatial fix’ – transferring crises elsewhere through 
geographical restructuring and the re-territorialization of social space.105 As Caison and 
Vormann note, “uneven development remains the defining feature of neoliberal urban 
change in all contexts.”106 Therefore, on a political, economic, and spatial level, elite-
centered plans create a future Palestinian homeland that is politically, economically, and 
most importantly, spatially fragmented. The vision at hand is highly undemocratic, 
worsens the trend towards social inequality, and is testament to the balance of class 
forces present in the Palestinian proto-state.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The establishment of industrial zones, estates, and free trade zones are undoubtedly some 
of the most ambitious projects in the Palestinian economy. Heralded as a way to generate 
viable employment, jump start Palestinian industry, attract investment, and promote 
economic development, this article has cast doubt on these claims. Instead, this article has 
demonstrated that the industrial zones in contemporary Palestine, especially the BIE, 
JAIP, JIFZ, and the TIE, are not geared towards promoting meaningful economic 
development. It appears that the industrial zones in Palestine fail on two levels. Firstly, 
they fail on their own terms as successful export processing zones and employment 
generating hubs. Secondly, even when they do succeed, their performance is limited, they 
fail to create effective linkages with the domestic economy, and they do not contribute to 
a holistic and inclusive strategy for Palestinian economic development. The small 
benefits that they do reap often serve the interests of foreign capital and a small segment 
of Palestinian political-economic elites.  
These zones are ineffective in promoting wider Palestinian economic 
development, as produce for export is prioritized over local needs, farmers are 
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dispossessed from their lands, which in turn further threatens local agriculture, and, in 
some cases, the establishment of the zones strengthens certain aspects of the Israeli 
Occupation. Additionally, the spatial dynamics of the industrial zones suggest that the 
creation of small, fragmented pockets of economic activity to be integrated with the 
global economy is actually an effect produced by the confluence of class forces present 
within the Palestinian proto-state, the heavy hand of IFIs, and the Israeli Occupation. The 
zones seek to function outside the Occupation as splintered economic nodes servicing the 
expansion of global capital. However, in doing so, they create very few linkages with the 
local economy, with the exception of the exploitation of Palestinian labour. Therefore, on 
the spatial level, industrial zones in Palestine are not poised to effectively promote a 
coherent Palestinian economic strategy. In effect, the contours of the Palestinian political 
economy are increasingly being defined by political, economic, and spatial fragmentation 
– a future that is undemocratic and worsens the trend towards social inequality. 
Lastly, Israeli capital and the security industry seem to benefit from the 
establishment of the industrial zones but, paradoxically, the establishment of the zones 
are routinely delayed, and in some cases, damaged by Israeli authorities. This speaks 
volumes about the arbitrary, unpredictable nature of the Israeli Occupation and the 
institutional complexities surrounding it. Whilst we cannot apply a solid theoretical 
framework to understand the arbitrary nature of the Israeli Occupation, it does illustrate 
the fact that Palestinian economic development cannot be dependent on the Occupier’s 
goodwill – it is simply not a reliable developmental strategy. That a multitude of elite 
powers has always controlled the development of industrial zones in Palestine is 
testament to the zones’ inability to serve the local needs of the Palestinian economy and 
thereby promote Palestinian economic development. Additionally, the international 
community needs to exert greater due diligence and pressure on Israel when supplying 
aid to such programs that purport to promote Palestinian economic development, but 
which in reality, often benefit Israeli capital. Since IFIs and donor agencies are providing 
aid for developmental programs instead of Israel (as Israel had previously done before the 
Oslo Accords), but the latter still acts as an occupying power, then this process amounts 
to nothing less than subsidizing the costs of occupation. Does this not serve to de-
incentivize Israel in ending its Occupation? 
Instead, IFIs, donor agencies, and Palestinian elites must recognize that problems 
pertaining to development in Palestine are largely political issues and cannot be solved 
solely through economic measures. While Palestinian policy makers are unable to end the 
Israeli Occupation themselves, the international community needs to take more effective 
steps in pressuring Israel to end its Occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, halt 
the expansion of settlements, and allow for the free movement of Palestinians. Providing 
developmental assistance for the Palestinians is clearly necessary for the survival of 
Palestinian society, but  given that Israel still occupies the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
while no longer providing assistance (as it had done previously), this risks creating a 
moral hazard by lowering the costs of occupation. In terms of Palestinian developmental 
strategy, Palestinian elites, donor agencies, and IFIs need to cater to the direct and local 
needs of Palestinians. Most importantly, Palestinians are in dire need of stable access to 
basic resources such as water and electricity and this needs to be addressed. Other crucial 
needs include, but are not limited to, viable and stable employment, housing provisions, 
education, protection of agricultural industries, provisions of credit, and investments in 
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social infrastructure that promote local capital accumulation. One of the main objectives 
must be to create internal cohesion as opposed to spatial fragmentation. Moreover, 
Palestinian economic planners and their foreign counterparts must fundamentally re-think 
approaches to economic development through offshore strategies. These zones, which 
allow for the free movement of capital and profits, while accelerating the 
internationalization of capital, do not create effective linkages with the domestic 
economy and impede processes of local capital accumulation. It is impossible for 
meaningful, holistic, and egalitarian development to take place under low-paid wage 
work. Furthermore, developmental projects, such as the development of industrial zones, 
has largely taken place within elite circles without the broad representation of 
Palestinians, with poor results. Economic planning needs to be radically democratized in 
order to cater to the needs of ordinary Palestinians. However, the class forces present in 
the Palestinian proto-state owe their position more to neoliberal aid packages such as the 
PRDP and to Gulf private equity firms more than to the people they purport to represent. 
Without a fundamental restructuring of class forces in the state, the democratization of 
economic planning in Palestine cannot occur. The people of Palestine, who are supposed 
to be the ones benefiting from these projects, will continue to be marginalized. 
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Appendix A: Maps and Charts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Location of the JIFZ in the north-west of the Jenin district: (high) the green line and the Al 
Jalama check point 
Source: Sironi, et al. A Feasibility Analysis of the Jenin Sustainable Industrial and Logistics District. 123. 
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Figure 2: Existing cultivated areas and cropping 
pattern in the projected site for the BIE. (Green color 
is devoted to olive and yellow to field crops) 
Figure 3: Local inhabitants’ response to 
the BIE 
Source: Hammad et al. Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessment and Action Plan (ESIAAP) for 
Bethlehem Multi Industrial Park (BMIP). 25. 
Source: Hammad et al. Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessment and Action Plan (ESIAAP) for 
Bethlehem Multi Industrial Park (BMIP). 24. 
